

Research Space

Journal article

**Joe Hughes (2008) Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation,
New York: Continuum.**

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Joe Hughes (2008) *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation*, New York: Continuum.

Joe Hughes' recent study *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation* makes the apparently straightforward claim that Deleuze's 'middle period', and indeed beyond, should be read as a consistent and repeated meditation on the processes of the constitution of representation. Its syntheses, and their necessary constitutions of subjectivity, of forms of production and of time provide a tangibly coherent theme across these apparently quite different texts. Running counter to the image of Deleuze as an endlessly inventive concept factory, Hughes unequivocally reads *The Logic of Sense*, *Anti-Oedipus* and *Difference and Repetition* as each in their own way articulating a systematic phenomenological return to essentially the same process of the constitution of experience. Despite its beginning with and constantly emphasising the transcendental, 'Deleuze's thought ends in phenomena, an empirical consciousness of fully individuated objects' (6). But Hughes' text is more than a review of Deleuze's relations with phenomenology. As the Preface makes clear, while the influence of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger on Deleuze has not escaped critical notice, the 'Husserlian inspiration behind Deleuze's work' has been overlooked. Given the few direct references to Husserl in the books in question, this is understandable. But Hughes makes a strong case particularly for the relevance of Husserl's late work in understanding Deleuze's treatment of genetic constitution. This locating of the basic motivation behind these texts in a consistent body of influence is the key to Hughes' presentation of Deleuze's work as the project of 'a systematic and totalizing thinker' (157) occupied with the problem of genesis 'from the very first book to the last' (15). Deleuze is of course well known for describing his philosophy as classical and metaphysical, and his thought as 'like a hill' which changes very little, especially in contrast to Guattari's (in)famously volatile hyperactivity. Hughes' skill lies in looking into this immobility and highlighting the ways in which key themes and indeed structuring processes persist at the heart of key texts.

In so doing Hughes carries out a task which bears comparison with literary detective work. The comparison may seem ad hoc, but it helps to emphasise just how engaging and well-written Hughes' study really is, drawing on the work of Husserl, among others, to bear witness to Deleuze's phenomenology. Moreover, while few would underplay the importance of literature to Deleuze, Hughes implies that we might well to take its formal influence even more seriously. We are reminded

early on that *The Logic of Sense* describes itself as 'an attempt to develop a logical and psychological novel' (20), and Hughes takes this reference at its word. His detective work attempts to unravel story from plot and to draw a series of incisive deductions and conclusions with something of the style of a sleuth tracing the clues in a particularly thorny case.

Hughes draws from this literary reference, however, an approach not only to style but also to content. He claims this narratological logic of plot and story can be discerned across the work of this period and beyond, with examples reaching from *Empiricism and Subjectivity* to the final texts. In making this well-argued claim, Hughes offers revealing insights into the repetition of key themes under the sign (although not the style) of the novel. And if, following his lead, Hughes' own text were to conceal a story beneath its plot, what would it be? The *plot* is quite clearly an investigation of the importance of experience and representation, and of how, from a phenomenological standpoint, they are constituted. But the *story* uncovers Deleuze's monistic return to this theme just as a *Série noire* detective novel might consider the mechanics of serial criminality of a mind perhaps unaware of its own *idée fixe*. If the 'French school' of such fiction draws its conclusions from basic intuition and gut feelings, while the 'English' school works by deduction and evidence (Deleuze 2003: 115), one would have to say that here Hughes displays the second method while perhaps taking inspiration and drive from the first. Many readers of Deleuze are in equal measure intrigued and perplexed by the apparent proliferation of ideas which nevertheless seem, perhaps paradoxically at first, to cohere into a project. This project, partly masked by constant shifts in terminology, focus, sources and collaborators, is the concern of *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation*. But Hughes' detective story is less a 'whodunit' than a 'howdunit', because he has clearly also seen that an important underlying thread does indeed link the range, however volcanic, of Deleuze's work. The aim therefore is to elucidate how this cohesion comes about, and the hunch is followed up in a style which might be described as Holmesian: deductive, incisive and self-assured, but not without a certain dry wit and even, at times, theatricality, in its claims.

Hughes' argument similarly has the advantage of a formal simplicity in so far as the book is divided into three parts, each dealing with one of the texts in question. Part one explores and justifies the focus on Husserl, considering the way his ideas are reflected in *The Logic of Sense*. Part two turns to *Anti-Oedipus* and the genesis of the ego

in desiring and social production; while part three draws together the static and dynamic geneses as described in *Difference and Repetition*. Each section lays out its points and draws partial conclusions which both reinforce the central thesis and open out to related issues. One example among many is the way part three considers, on top of the general theme of genesis, *Difference and Repetition*'s postulation of the non-transcendental constitution of time. Hughes is able not only to unravel Deleuze's description of these processes, but also to round up this complex problem succinctly:

[I]n other words, just as the other two passive syntheses produced not representations in specific temporal modalities, but the transcendental possibility of those modalities themselves, this third synthesis does not produce a determinate future, but the transcendental element of the future in general. (149)

This tracking of the ways in which the syntheses of the sub-representational domain are inseparable from the constitution of modalities of time themselves allows Hughes to return to this relationship in his conclusion. Here, he clearly identifies the important threshold between the sub-representational domain and the emergence of consciousness of phenomena as representations: 'In the third synthesis, however, time ceases to be transcendental. By means of the progressive determination and actualization of Ideas, time becomes a representation which passes in the present of an empirical consciousness' (154).

This succinctness is used to good effect throughout the book and plays a part in conferring an impressive degree of coherence to the text as a whole. This is clearly intended, of course, and is all the more evident on closer reading of the three sections.

In the first part, Hughes begins by outlining those areas of Husserlian phenomenology which form the basis of *The Logic of Sense*. Among these, he highlights two phenomenological moves, namely those of *reduction*, or the putting out of play of those phenomena which are not part of the objectively given world, and of *constitution*, or the genetic production of objects in consciousness. The latter is especially important in that thought as representation, the building of the transcendental from the empirical, can only be meaningful if we have a theory of how objects and sense are constituted in the first place. Accordingly, the theory of perception developed in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* is also stressed in its postulation of immanent relations between objects. Keen to counter prevailing views of Deleuze as anti-phenomenological,

Hughes argues that, although Deleuze ‘never makes a big deal of the reduction’ (6), critics (such as Lawlor and Brassier) are right to contend that, despite appearances, he ends up in a basically phenomenological position: consciousness of individuated objects in a field of perception where relations always already exist. In support of this, examples of ‘significant use’ of the reduction are drawn from *Proust and Signs* and from Deleuze’s criticisms of the image of thought, particularly in *Difference and Repetition*, where ‘Deleuze’s critique of the image of thought can thus be read as a reaffirmation of the necessity for reduction even if he does not use that particular word’ (8).

Two important and related issues are linked to this, as the text makes clear. The first is that, whatever other forms of phenomenology or their interpreters may claim, this stance is by no means some idealistic or relativistic denial of objective reality. The approach adopted by Husserl/Deleuze does not deny the existence of external reality: the table as phenomenon does not replace or cancel out the table as object. The action of putting assumptions out of play does not leave us confronting nothing, but rather instantiates the existence of the world of phenomena *in addition to* that of objective reality. The second point, again stressed throughout by Hughes, concerns the role of meaning. Despite being central in Deleuze, Hughes picks it up as a key source of misunderstandings. As he reminds us at several points in the text, the world of the real as sense (hyletic) data is meaningless by itself until sense is bestowed onto it by the passive syntheses. The commonplace view that Deleuze argues that we should ask ‘what does it do?’ rather than ‘what does it mean?’ is only valid up to this threshold of the emergence of meaning, as we will see below. It follows that Deleuzian questioning of the validity of interpretation or the consideration of meaning in communication needs to be understood in the light of their constitution.

Accordingly, Deleuze’s critique of given forms of transcendence therefore relies on an ability not just to postulate the constitution of objects in experience, but also to describe the processes in question. For Hughes, much of Deleuze’s work centres on this very task. Like Husserl, Deleuze is concerned not just with describing phenomena, but also with explaining them and their processes. Unlike the early Husserl however, Deleuze is only interested in genetic phenomenology, or the immediate production of sense rather than its sedimentation. It is not hard at this point to agree that this relationship exists in a Deleuzian consideration of meaning as event, and Hughes’ focus on this point takes its justification precisely from this link. The clarity and confidence with which these arguments are made is something of a hallmark and deserves, I think,

wide recognition. Just as this claim is made, Hughes makes a point of making clear not only what has been said, but also what is going to be covered and how. He carefully lays out Husserl's stance and situates it exactly in his argument, showing how far Deleuze follows Husserl and at which points they diverge, for instance in the former's critique of a Husserlian lack of phenomenological rigor or its intentionality, as we will see.

However, the fact that the text appears to be arguing that the whole of Deleuze's work can in effect be rooted in one concept of Husserl's phenomenology may well strike some readers as problematic. Hughes himself accepts that this does not necessarily justify our use of the phenomenology label—admittedly a question 'of little importance' (19). What it does do, however, is to situate the movement of Deleuze's thought between two well-defined poles: the *genesis* of thought is to be scrutinised, and the method of *reduction* is to be used as a basic observational technique. It is in this light that we should read *The Logic of Sense*, and, according to Hughes, *Anti-Oedipus*.

Part two's focus on *Anti-Oedipus* as description of genesis is particularly interesting in so far as it brings a certain coherence to the proliferation of ideas for which the book is notorious. The treatment of the text and its complexities is both systematic and enlightening and as such complements existing studies by Goodchild (1996), Holland (1999) and, more recently, Buchanan (2008), with which readers are doubtless familiar. A crucial argument, however, is made regarding the claim to identify cross-textual themes. Not only does reading *Anti-Oedipus* from the point of view of production make the text easier to understand, but, in fact, 'if the book is read as a collection of separate concepts with only ambiguous relations to one another, it becomes impossible to understand' (66). Whether Hughes is right naturally depends on whether we accept his central claim. But his analysis does at the very least also raise some interesting questions. The first of these is whether Deleuze's work is one which should be 'understood' on these terms. Speaking personally, I feel that Hughes' argument is convincing, but some readers will doubtless point to the many ways in which a work such as *Anti-Oedipus* seems to escape categorisation in any way, least of all, perhaps, in terms of meaning. As Foucault once suggested (mischievously perhaps?), meaning itself might be displaced by the *effectiveness* of this 'thing', which he 'dare not even call a book', and which refers to nothing other than its 'own prodigious theoretical inventiveness' (Foucault 1997: 7). This issue of the displacement of meaning by effect—*what does it mean?* by *what does it do?*—is one which Hughes

takes up, arguing that we are wrong to assume that meaning is never relevant, as we have seen. For Deleuze, a focus on the meaning-less depths does not mean that meaning itself is excised from thought, merely that it must be understood as produced on top of the genetic syntheses of experience. In this light, the demystification of the text as *object* is welcome, especially to newer readers of Deleuze who often turn, rightly or wrongly, to *Anti-Oedipus* before some of the less well-known books.

The second question raised by Hughes' argument introduces its own double movement. Because it is necessary for Hughes to demonstrate his thesis across a range of texts, there is the implicit need to reassess the role of Guattari in the collaborations. The aim here, it would seem, is not to expunge Guattari's contributions—which Deleuze of course stresses as being of fundamental importance, for instance in well-known passages of *Dialogues* (Deleuze and Parnet 1996: 23–4). However, to argue that Deleuze's concern with genesis is a *continuous* theme requires that it be shown to lie at the heart of the collaborative work, which, by that token, must be revealed to be essentially 'Deleuzian'. Guattari, I will suggest later, comes out of this argument as a peripheral figure, almost as collateral damage.

Part three tackles *Difference and Repetition* with much the same gusto as parts one and two. Hughes is keen to point out that his view goes 'against the grain' of current readings which emphasise the text as 'more or less a theory only of the static genesis' (103). On the contrary, we are exhorted to see *Difference and Repetition* alongside the other texts studied and to realise that for Deleuze, *the* question of the world of phenomena and its genesis is the same throughout. Deleuze goes well beyond the constitution of experience itself, however. He theorises not just the actualisation of phenomena in individual, differentiated subjects, but also describes how this is necessarily implicated in the production of temporality itself: not only does the virtual engender unindividuated actuality, but the process is reciprocal, and founded on the production of time as actualisation takes place. In typical style, Hughes outlines in a brief table just how schematic this process is, at least in its correspondence between texts. Clear parallels are drawn between dynamic genesis, desiring production and the production of time, on one hand, and static genesis, social production and differentiation-individuation on the other.

Interestingly, Hughes begins his explanation by problematising critical readings (e.g. those of Badiou or Hallward) of Deleuze as 'otherworldly', particularly in his emphasis on the virtual. The point missed by such critics is that Deleuze does indeed theorise the constitution of the virtual

as *a time* in which Ideas are structured: by proving the concreteness of Ideas and the determination of the virtual, we can show how the virtual–actual dyad escapes this critique of Deleuze as being a merely contemplative thinker. The central argument is that for Deleuze creative actualisation is the ‘true meaning of time’ (110): it is the very process of progressive determination which determines where Ideas come from and go to. It is the process by which the future itself becomes present and is thus an indispensable movement of realisation.

Here Hughes is typically concise in his definitions and argument:

I want to suggest here that the Deleuzian Idea is the form that any concrete object takes before we fully recognise or know what that object is. In the Idea, the object itself becomes a problem for thought. Progressive determination would then be nothing more than the progressive determination of a concrete object of perception. (115)

What’s more, this welcome concision is not infrequently accompanied by a certain dry humour: ‘Despite the fact that Deleuze used the vocabulary of biology and the example of differentiation in the egg almost exclusively to describe the process of actualization, we have to notice that the outcome of this process is not a chicken’ (116).

Despite (or perhaps because of) its focus, Hughes’ study is able to lend some clarity to key elements of the Deleuzian panoply, almost as an aside. One example is the development of an argument which clearly presents the role of representation as the end point of quality and extensity which can only refer to represented objects as such. If actualisation produces psychological consciousness, then it does so via the forms of representation as ‘the element of knowledge’ (118) which has its own legitimate and non-legitimate uses.

This section of Hughes’ book (119–26) is one of the richest and best argued, presenting a whole series of points which tie into the main theme. We return to the ‘dead representations’ of *The Logic of Sense*, and the *legitimate* use of representation which recognises its necessarily mobile nature, being ‘legitimate insofar as it is tied to its process of production’ (120). The point is important enough to attract the claim that it ‘seems to be the ultimate aim of *Difference and Repetition*, and perhaps of Deleuze’s philosophy in this middle period as a whole’ (119). The role of representation is especially important if we take Hughes’ point that it must be understood as a result of static genesis: rather than being *dynamic* in movement and material dispersion it begins in a form of time and culminates in representation as, ultimately, a *static* form of things available to human consciousness.

This of course leads to a final description of dynamic genesis equated to the production of time (127). After covering the familiar ground of Bergsonian analysis of (dis)continuity in time/movement, Hughes argues that the necessary syntheses of movement cannot be produced without a form of originary subjectivity which carries out the synthesis. Hughes' reading of *Difference and Repetition* makes crucial links here between the role of habit and contraction and synthesis itself in the formation of subjectivity, but he also stresses the latter's limited field of operation. It is the limited ability of the subject to 'grasp' the fullness of its experiences that leads to its exhaustion. It seems worth noting that Hughes' point about the translatability of these ideas across the whole of Deleuze is quite borne out by reflections of just this point in later work, notably in *The Time Image*, where Deleuze draws explicitly on Blanchot (Deleuze 1985: 221–2). The 'contemplative soul', or synthetic ego seen in the work of Europe's great film directors, is not one of Husserlian intentionality, but rather of the individual gifted only with the 'empty power to exchange itself for something'. This power, being empty only in so far as it exchanges itself for everything, is exactly the same as that of the 'seers' whose 'impower of thought' Deleuze situates in cinema's special ability to create such images through characters such as Johannes in Dreyer's *Ordet*.

In the psychic situation of films such as *Ordet*, it is the character as seer who, apparently a marionette incapable of thought or action, relies instead on belief, thus reminding us of the need to affirm both the irrationality of the real and our relationship with this world rather than attempting to transcend it with 'reason'. As Ambrose (2007) stresses, what is striking is the way in which the automatic can force thought, how the very lack of rational awareness of characters can inspire movement in our own reflective processes. Hughes, by demonstrating the (progressively) determined nature of subjectivity, draws a line of connection from the earliest work on Hume directly into the cinema books and the consideration of subjectivity that closes his third chapter, stressing the role of constitution and the implications this has for alterity.

This closing section is one where one fully appreciates that, across the three chapters of *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation*, a key strength of the study is its own coherence, down in part to the extreme care taken to make points clearly. We are left in no doubt as to the goal of the text in showing that 'there is a very general yet consistent conceptual structure behind Deleuze's three central texts, and that this structure traced out a consistent theory of the genesis of representation'

(158). This clarity ranges from statements of the intent of the study, to the cross-reference of points throughout its three main chapters. Each part builds on the others and frequent links forward and back are of great help as complex arguments are followed across texts. Hughes, as we have seen, has a talent for pithy summaries which many readers will appreciate. This is perhaps especially the case when they develop a real sense of dialogue with the reader by basing deductions on questions which, Hughes rightly assumes, the reader is likely to ask at a given stage. Consequently—and somewhat in tune with the detective novel theme—rather than present his arguments as *faits accomplis*, Hughes is not afraid to ask questions as if thinking through the points himself, which makes one feel at home within the argument and often slightly less uncomfortable about having failed to grasp a particular point. This, alongside the combination of detailed argument and concise roundups, succeeds in making the text open to a wide readership, indeed clarifying some points as well as, if not better than, some introductory guides. A good example of this is the way in which Hughes tackles ‘side’ themes, such as of ‘fatigue’ (137–8) which, as he points out, may be assumed to result from the passage of time. Since Hughes shows that time cannot depend for its constitution on syntheses which in turn depend on other syntheses, it makes no sense to see exhaustion as being a result of the passage of time in infinite regress. The genetic ego therefore suffers fatigue, on the contrary, because of its limited ability to contract relations and exhausts itself because it contemplates too much, ‘trying to possess too many instants in one grasp’ (138). Despite appearances and quasi-causes, then, the cause of fatigue—and hence of stability and escape from raw being—occurs within and because of a limited, immanent contractual range.

The reader is also struck by Hughes’ refusal to be put off by Deleuze’s terminological variety, concluding on the contrary that this is no obstacle once one has perceived the basic unity of the work and that despite manifest differences of style and language, essential themes recur in the three texts in question. All that really changes is the terms used to describe the movement of thought through the stages of perception, a point to which the text often returns: ‘Despite the complete disparity in technical vocabulary between books, there is a very strong correspondence in their separate descriptions of these early stages of the genesis’ (140). The attention paid by Hughes to this issue is extremely helpful. For instance, while it is true, he argues, that the word ‘genesis’ appears only four times in *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, and even then only to be criticised, we need to understand that the reference in this

context is precisely to the Husserlian 'sedimentation' theory of sense which Deleuze rejects elsewhere in favour of a more immediate and dynamic interpretation. We are able therefore to see that the question of *Empiricism and Subjectivity* is exactly that of the phenomenological question of genesis: how does the subject arise from the given? (16).

These correspondences are supported by diagrams along the way which show clearly how evolving sequences of syntheses relate to each other. These culminate in a table (156) which shows how they relate across the three texts studied. Given the sometimes oblique ways in which Deleuze returns to topics from different angles, such schematisations will be welcome to many in providing a 'key' of sorts to the proliferating language which, if we are honest, can at times both delight and frustrate us as readers.

Adding to this Hughes' careful and sustained policy of recapping and pre-capping, it becomes obvious from the way the text summarises key points and presents others upstream that the whole project has been worked out with the explicit goal of carrying the reader through complex terrain. This is particularly obvious in part two, where Hughes deals deftly with *Anti-Oedipus*, shedding a good deal of light on this demanding text. Given the obviously daunting range of Deleuze and Guattari's first collaboration, there is much to be said for an approach which selects one theme and follows it through the different permutations to which it is subjected throughout the book, thus cracking open some of its complexities. Moreover, comparing the same themes across texts, rather than complicating things, actually makes them more accessible, and once basic ideas have been established, the reader can with more confidence use knowledge from one text to make sense of another.

This confidence rubs off partly from Hughes' own, which is clear in instances where he takes critical aim at a number of commonplaces. Included on the list of misreaders is Foucault, for instance, guilty of taking 'phantasm' to mean the same in *The Logic of Sense* as it does in *Difference and Repetition* (165 n. 34). Deleuze's purported anti-Hegelianism may also be entirely unfounded (134), with the former offering instead a 'flashy Hegel' and a contingent view of history whose non-teleology 'still progresses according to a dialectical logic of sublimation or double causality' (170 n. 18). A further example is Hughes' convincing argument that a clarification of detours in the treatment of the syntheses in *Difference and Repetition* justifies their being understood as operating in linear fashion. Despite Deleuze's roundabout way of presenting the concepts, we need, for Hughes, to

understand them as following a progression: each one relates to the previous in a series of transcendental exercises (129) of each faculty.

Beyond the confident style, Hughes also has a series of genuine points about Deleuze that seem well worth making and has produced a text which, oddly perhaps, seems to fulfil two very different purposes. In the first instance, it is a scholarly study of some of the most complex ideas in the work of notoriously problematic thinkers. Hughes' weaving of a web of relations between Kant, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze is something of a feat, but it might be more appropriate to call it an 'instruction'. Secondly, therefore, in situating Deleuze's thought, concepts such as static and dynamic genesis are explained with both an eye to detail and an impressive command of the big picture and the lines of argument being followed. The point here is that the text appears to be achieving that rare goal of speaking to a remarkably wide audience of both specialists and neophytes. A lack of familiarity with the intricacies of Husserl's late work is not a problem since the concepts are so clearly laid out. What is more, the way these concepts are treated is extremely helpful for anyone 'perplexed' by the difficulties of Deleuze and the context of his ideas.

At the end of the book, Hughes seems to suggest that we may want to question this apparently monotonous focus on the same theme, and he is surely right to maintain a critical line. Craven homages to Deleuze (and Guattari) which do little other than repeat their *mots d'ordre* do nothing at all either for neophytes or those already familiar with the work. Hughes' criticality is refreshing then, and succeeds in operating in the space between either glorifying or sacrificing Deleuze. Hughes, thankfully, does neither, choosing instead a much finer path of balanced and detailed critique whose aim is to clarify, explicate and situate his subject.

Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, then, ultimately impresses by the strength and clarity of its arguments. Are there nevertheless details which some readers may find problematic?

For Hughes, few have actually considered the debt owed by Deleuze to phenomenology, and fewer still have been able to link his ideas clearly to those of, for instance, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on this score. To support these claims, repeated references are made to the essentially phenomenological nature of Deleuze's work. For some, this will come as no surprise: Francois Dosse's recent biography, despite describing Deleuze's attitude to phenomenology as 'ambivalent' and the link to Husserl as largely superficial, reveals that Merleau-Ponty's *The Visible and the Invisible* was a favourite text (Dosse 2007: 189). Toscano describes Deleuze as developing from Husserl 'an-other phenomenology'

(Toscano 2005: 204). The extent to which Hughes' reading goes 'against the grain' then, might be open to question. Similarly, there are times when the welcome degree of incisiveness and confidence risks tipping over into a boldness which some might find excessive. One example is when Hughes claims early on that 'the only way to understand Deleuze's texts is to understand them as a theorization of genesis, and the only way to understand a Deleuzian concept... is to determine its place and function within the genesis in which it participates' (16).

Not all will agree that 'the only way' to understand these texts is indeed the one offered here. But the excessiveness or otherwise of these claims can be judged only on the evidence made available, and Hughes certainly provides plenty. Moreover, if the thesis of unity in the work unsettles some readers, it will be welcomed by those disquieted by readings which appear to see Deleuze as a sort of concept factory whose productive machinery required no fuel, pulling rabbits out of hats. I made the point earlier on that Hughes' demystification is no bad thing in attacking views of Deleuze which may appear both sanctifying and actually unhelpful. While failing to explain anything much at all about the work, they also provide ammunition to those who, rather than welcome inventiveness, reproach what they see as obfuscation, barbarism, irresponsibility and so on. Perhaps someday Deleuzians with time on their hands will quantify just how much effort has been spent rectifying the mis- (or non-) readings which proliferate, especially across the social sciences, of Deleuze (and Guattari). A far better idea though would be to consider Hughes' text as an example of how elucidating the genealogy through an *explication* of Deleuze's work can provide a genuine *explanation* of some of its most difficult ideas. Placing the fabric of relations under the magnifying glass lifts them off the plane and gives them a shape which allows us to see the texture of the individual pieces and their warp and weft. The genuinely critical spirit behind this raises questions about simplistic notions of creativity while providing extremely useful contextual information about which other fingerprints can be found on Deleuze's work. Some may disagree with Hughes that this demonstrates a profound, almost monotonous, unity in Deleuze's work at the level of its basic concerns. But I feel it must be accepted that whereas he generates both light and heat, Hughes should be congratulated for shedding much more of the former than the latter.

That said, and on a different and perhaps rather ungenerous note, there are times when Hughes' impressive clarity seems to slip a little. Deleuze, as we know, claimed to 'believe in philosophy as a system' (Deleuze 2003: 338), but there are times when Hughes' phraseology seems to imply chinks of doubt that the systemic and systematic nature

of the work is indeed clearly demonstrable. If Deleuze's concepts initially 'all come together to form a consistent, if not systematic, theory of genetic constitution' (20), they later become 'systematic but incoherent' (155), and then 'systematic and totalizing' further on (157). The extent to which these phrases actually cloud Hughes' point, however, is minimal, and examples of this sort of hesitation are rare in the overall tone of extreme clarity and incision.

A further reaction to *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation* may occur to readers who conclude that Hughes, contrary to Deleuze's advice (Deleuze 2003: 339–40), fails to remain concrete by giving one concept primacy over another and focusing so closely on the essential nature of genesis. This would be unfair, however, in that the text is at pains to stress the ways in which Deleuzian syntheses are explications of one another – albeit in a particular order – in contradistinction to their Kantian counterparts whose a priori nature fails to explain their constitution. A desire to engage with concrete questions beyond those of 'simple' perception also guides Hughes' insistence on the complex role of alterity in the system: it is the world without others, in its schizophrenic depths, which makes genesis *necessary* as an escape from the chaos of raw being (150–3). It is once more significant that on this point, as on many others, Hughes sees a direct lineage between Husserl and Deleuze.

A final potential concern returns to the issue, raised by Hughes himself, of the implications of recent biographical information for our understanding of the Deleuze–Guattari writing relationship. One may on one level recognise reflections of the not uncommon desire to 'de-Guattarise' Deleuze, which takes effect, intentionally or not, in three ways. On the one hand, works are grouped together that some may consider disparate, seeing no reason to assume that a co-authored text should be considered any differently to individual work on this account. Hughes moreover clearly considers *What is Philosophy?* to be 'Deleuze's last major work' (157), as indeed Deleuze himself seems to imply when stating his desire to write 'a short text' offering a clarification of the notion of concepts (Deleuze 2003: 339). On the other hand, Hughes insists that the themes which underpin apparently diverse works are the same: it is, by implication, Deleuze's underlying obsession with representation that is the real 'story' across the whole corpus. A third example of the erasure of Guattari from the scene is provided by Guattari himself, who claimed, in the *Anti-Oedipus Papers*, that he did not 'recognise' himself in *Anti-Oedipus* (Guattari 2006). Beyond details in support of the hypothesis downgrading Guattari's role, whether or not Hughes is correct to follow this thread depends of course largely on the evidence he brings to the investigation, and the latter

is substantial. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Kant's particular forms of phenomenology are brought to bear in ways which make a convincing case for identifying the hand of Deleuze at the centre even of the joint work. Coupled with Dosse's (2007) description of the decline in the Deleuze–Guattari relationship, and his claim that *What is Philosophy?* was indeed essentially written by the former, one might be tempted to agree with Genosko (2001) that there is indeed a concerted and slightly skewed attempt to de-Guattarise the 'Deleuziana'. And yet while there is certainly something to be said for demystifying the idea of a four-handed concept factory, it would clearly be unfair to include Hughes among those who maintain the 'bad Guattari' thesis. On the one hand, there is no obvious reason why one should not focus on the key concerns of one part of the authorial assemblage if one chooses, and indeed the complexities of some of the arguments here certainly justify it. *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation* is no biography, and as a piece of detection is not a 'whodunit' but a 'howdunit'. Were it the former, and spoke of 'de-Guattarising' Deleuze, why not also 'de-Deleuze' the advocate of 'becoming-imperceptible' himself?

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
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
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


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